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Abstract Impairments in cognitive control generating
deviant adaptive cognition have been proposed to account
for the strong preference for repetitive behavior in autism.
We examined if this preference reflects intentional deficits
rather than problems in task execution in the broader aut-
ism phenotype using the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ).
Participants chose between two tasks differing in their
relative strength by indicating first their voluntary task
choice and then responding to the subsequently presented
stimulus. We observed a stronger repetition bias for the
harder task in high AQ participants, with no other differ-
ences between the two groups. These findings indicate that
the interference between competing tasks significantly
contributes to repetitive behavior in autism by modulating
the formation of task intentions when choosing tasks
voluntarily.
Keywords Autism  Autism-Spectrum Quotient 
Cognitive control  Perseveration  Repetitive behavior 
Voluntary task switching
Introduction
Human goal-directed behavior relies on neurocognitive
control processes that allow for sustaining focus on tasks
without being distracted, and for adapting to dynamically
changing environmental conditions of daily life by shifting
focus when necessary. This adaptive human cognition has
often been studied in the lab using experiments in which
participants rapidly switch between different tasks. From
these studies we know that, although the ability to exert
intentional control is not self evident as shown in different
patient studies (e.g., Aron et al. 2004), the way it is
expressed in behavior of typically developing individuals
depends on a complex interaction between current inten-
tions and past experiences (see e.g., Kiesel et al. 2010;
Koch et al. 2010; Vandierendonck et al. 2010 for a review
on behavioral findings; and Sakai 2008 for a review on
findings from neuroimaging studies). Interestingly, while
intentional control certainly provides the basis for cogni-
tive flexibility, recent studies on task switching have
reported empirical evidence for a consistent preference for
repetitive voluntary behavior in healthy population. Spe-
cifically, when given an option to voluntarily choose which
task to perform in each trial, while being encouraged to
choose tasks at random and equally often, participants
show a tendency to repeat tasks more often than to switch
between them (e.g., Arrington and Logan 2004; Mayr and
Bell 2006). Our study investigated how this repetition bias
is expressed in healthy individuals with more autistic traits
when given voluntary choice of tasks.
Repetitive behavior has been recognized as one of the
key symptoms of autism spectrum disorders (ASD).
Broadly speaking, this neurodevelopmental disorder is
characterized by impaired social interaction and commu-
nication, and by restricted and repetitive behavior
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(APA 1994). Preference for repetitive behavior in indi-
viduals with autism has been reported both in everyday
settings and clinical observations (e.g., extreme resistance
to change of any kind) as well as in experimental settings
(e.g., preservative responses on neuropsychological mea-
sures). Empirical evidence is mainly provided by various
studies using a neuropsychological test—the Wisconsin
Card Sorting Test (WCST)—in which the participant is
required to sort different cards on the basis of three pos-
sible dimensions of the geometric figures depicted on the
presented cards. The currently relevant sorting dimension
is never explicitly given to the participant, and changes
according to a fixed number of trials. The participant
therefore needs to infer the sorting rule based on feedback
provided by the experimenter and to decide whether to
keep on applying the same rule or to change it. Perfor-
mance on this test is measured in terms of errors, focusing
in particular on perseverative errors that indicate trials in
which participants maintain applying the previously rele-
vant sorting rule, although the (error) feedback provided
indicates that the rule has changed.
Many studies have shown that, relative to normally
developing individuals and those with other neurodevelop-
mental disorders, individuals with autism exhibit highly
perseverative responses in the WCST (see Hill 2004a, for a
review). Based on these findings, it has been suggested that
individuals with autism are cognitively inflexible, or more
precisely, exhibit problems with switching between different
thoughts or actions when required (Hill 2004b). Intriguingly,
however, when tested in a more controlled experimental
settings, this idea of deficits in cognitive flexibility as mea-
sured by deviant task switching performance is hardly sup-
ported by any empirical evidence (see Geurts et al. 2009 for a
recent debate on this topic). For instance, Poljac et al. (2010)
used task cues to unambiguously specify the required task in
their study and reported that adolescents with autism swit-
ched between tasks in a similar way to their typically
developing controls but significantly better than their clinical
controls. This finding strongly implies that the deviations in
behavior of individuals with autism as detected by the WCST
cannot be accounted for in terms of an impaired ability to
switch tasks, leaving an important issue to be addressed
regarding the specific nature of the impaired mechanism
reflected in behavior as a tendency to perseverate.
Considering that individuals with autism find it difficult to
generate novel ideas and behaviors spontaneously (e.g.,
Boucher 1988; Craig and Baron-Cohen 1999; Turner 1999),
it is not surprising then that putting demands on their inten-
tional decision making in situations of undefined tasks—such
as in the WCST—generates behavioral differences when
compared with typically developing individuals. Following
the same logic, reducing referential ambiguity in tasks
(Preissler and Carey 2005) and directing of the intentions
externally (Poljac et al. 2010) unsurprisingly facilitates their
task performance such that it successfully eliminates behav-
ioral differences. Accordingly, repeating tasks that are no
longer appropriate might occur when the choice of the pos-
sible alternatives is not explicitly specified, leaving room for
other factors to determine the task choice. For instance, recent
studies on task switching using a voluntary procedure—in
which participants are free to choose which task to perform on
each trial—show that participants’ tendency to repeat tasks
more often increases when the stimulus repeats (Arrington
and Logan 2005; Mayr and Bell 2006; Yeung 2010). This
finding suggests that bottom-up stimulus processing interacts
with global intentional control as measured by task choice.
The present study therefore aimed to investigate whether the
observed tendency to exhibit repetitive behavior in autism
could be explained in terms of bottom-up effects modulating
the formation of global intentions when the tasks are unam-
biguously specified but the choice of which task to execute in
a trial is voluntary.
To this aim, a double registration voluntary procedure
was used in which participants make two responses on each
trial: the first to register that they have made a choice of
task by pressing a spacebar, the second to respond to the
subsequently presented stimulus (see Millington et al.
2012, Experiment 2). Separating task choice from the
actual task execution allows us to disentangle the partici-
pants’ global task intentions from their specific actions.
Different studies have provided evidence that these two
consider related yet dissociable processes (Arrington and
Yates 2009; Butler et al. 2011; Mayr and Bell 2006; Yeung
2010). This distinction is important as it allows us to
address the specific question of whether repetitive behavior
in autism reflects intentional deficits rather than problems
with implementing the task rule (action) once a task choice
has been made (intention).
Of primary interest was to specifically investigate whe-
ther between-task interference would significantly contrib-
ute to the observed tendency to exhibit repetitive behavior in
autism. A common way to elicit clear effects of between-task
interference in task switching performance is by requiring
participants to switch between tasks that differ in their rel-
ative strength. Under these conditions, the performance costs
of task switching—as observed in slower response times
(RTs) and higher error rates—shows an asymmetry: the
switch costs seem to be greater for the easier task. This ini-
tially surprising, but now often replicated pattern of task
switching performance in both instructed (e.g., Allport et al.
1994) and voluntary (e.g., Liefooghe et al. 2010; Yeung
2010) procedures clearly indicate a role of between-task
interference in task execution. Interestingly, between-task
interference has also been reported to affect participants’
choice of tasks. Specifically, the repetition bias seems to be
stronger toward performing the more difficult task of a pair
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more often than the easier task (Liefooghe et al. 2010;
Millington et al. 2012; Yeung 2010), implying a clear
influence of between-task interference in the formation of
task intentions. To induce between-task interference in our
study we required the participants to voluntarily switch
between a relatively easy location task and a relatively hard
shape classification task.
Our participants were healthy individuals with either a
low or a high number of autistic traits as measured by a
self-report questionnaire that quantifies the extent of
autistic traits in healthy population—the Autism-spectrum
Quotient (AQ). The AQ has been used extensively to
investigate the broader ASD phenotype with converging
evidence that autism is not just a spectrum within the
clinical population, but that autistic traits are continuously
distributed through the general population (e.g., Baron-
Cohen et al. 2001; Hoekstra et al. 2007). Many studies have
shown that a higher position on the autism-like trait con-
tinuum of the AQ predicts cognitive processing similar to
but often milder than that found in ASD (e.g., Bayliss et al.
2005; Fugard et al. 2011; Poljac et al. 2012; Ridley et al.
2011; Stewart et al. 2009; von dem Hagen et al. 2011). The
AQ seems therefore to be sensitive to, and a useful tool for
assessing, the broader ASD phenotype in non-clinical
population (e.g., Bishop et al. 2004; Wheelwright et al.
2010).
In sum, this study was developed to test whether the
tendency of individuals with autism to engage in repetitive
behavior would also be detected in its broader phenotype
assessed with the AQ, with the main focus on the question
whether this repetitive behavior reflects intentional deficits
rather than problems in task execution. We specifically
tested the contribution of between-task interference to
repetitive behavior in individuals with high level of autistic
traits. We expected to find a stronger repetition bias in
individuals with more autistic traits if the repetitive
behavior in autism is mainly driven by between-task
interference (captured in behavior as an asymmetry in
registered measures) modulating the formation of task
intentions (task choice). We furthermore expected to find
no such difference in task performance (as measured in
terms of switch costs) if the repetition behavior is not
primarily driven by processes involved in eventual task
execution (RTs and errors) even in a setting that requires
flexible switching between tasks (cf. Poljac et al. 2010).
Method
Participants
Five hundred participants from the undergraduate psy-
chology program at the University of Leuven took part in a
pre-selection phase by completing the Autism-spectrum
Quotient (AQ) questionnaire. The students participated
voluntarily, for course credit and they all gave their written
informed consent prior to the inclusion into the study. The
protocol of the study was approved by the Ethics Com-
mittee of the Faculty of Psychology, University of Leuven,
and was carried out in accordance with the ethical stan-
dards laid down in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki.
Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ)
The AQ is developed to estimate the presence and extent of
autistic traits in healthy individuals, with scores ranging
between 0 (low autistic traits) and 50 (high autistic traits).
This questionnaire consists of 50 statements, for each of
which four forced choices are offered to indicate whether
participants ‘definitely agree’, ‘slightly agree’, ‘slightly
disagree’, or ‘definitely disagree’ with each statement. The
original administration of the test (Baron-Cohen et al.
2001) showed that 80 % of people with either Asperger
syndrome (AS) or high-functioning autism (HFA) had a
score between 32 and 50, whereas in a control group, only
2 % of people scored within that range. Based on this
finding, the authors suggested the AQ as a valuable
instrument for rapidly quantifying where any given indi-
vidual is situated on the continuum from autism to nor-
mality. In this study, a Dutch version (translation by Ponnet
et al. 2001) of the AQ (Baron-Cohen et al. 2001) was
employed to quantify the amount of autistic traits in our
participants. This AQ scale is highly comparable to the
Dutch AQ scale validated by Hoekstra et al. (2008), and
has already been successfully used by for instance Wouters
and Spek (2011) who showed that this version had very
high internal consistency in their typically developing
participants (standarized Crohnbach’s alpha = 0.92).
Stimuli and Tasks
Participants were presented with a shape (triangle, square,
or circle) in one of three adjacent squares in a stimulus grid
on each trial. At a viewing distance of approximately
60 cm, the stimulus grid was 2.6 high and 7.4 wide, and
the presented shape approximately filled one square within
the grid. The grid remained on the screen throughout the
experimental block. Participants were required to volun-
tarily choose to respond either to the location or to the
shape of each presented stimulus. Responding to the
location involved deciding whether the stimulus appeared
in left, center, or right location of the grid using a spatially
compatible keypress. Responding to the shape included
categorizing the shape identity with an arbitrarily mapped
keypress. Stimulus shape and location varied randomly
from trial to trial.
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While making the task choice voluntarily, the partici-
pants were also encouraged to choose the two tasks at
random and equally often. They were instructed to make
their choice prior to stimulus presentation, and were
reminded to do so by a cue consisting of the words
‘LOCATION/SHAPE’ appearing one above the other with
large question marks on either side. Specifically, partici-
pants indicated that they had made a task choice (regardless
of what that choice was) by pressing the spacebar. They
then responded to the imperative stimulus using the hand
appropriate for the chosen task. Half of the participants
responded with their left hand for the shape task and their
right hand for the location task. For the other half of the
participants this mapping was reversed. Response keys
were left/circle mapped to the leftmost finger of the
responding hand, center/square mapped to the middle fin-
ger, and right/triangle to the rightmost finger.
Procedure
Participants first completed the AQ questionnaire, and their
individual AQ scores were used as a selection criterion for
inclusion into the main experiment of voluntary task
choice. The cutoffs were derived from the 5 % highest (AQ
score [ 24) and 5 % lowest scores (AQ score \ 8) and
only those who scored above or below these cut-offs were
included in the main task (cf. Stewart et al. 2009).
Accordingly, 25 students were assigned to each group, of
whom 39 agreed to take part in the voluntary task-choice
experiment. Specifically, 21 participants (14 female) with a
score well above the average AQ (all scores above 24,
mean score 28.5 ± 4.2) and 18 participants (13 female)
who scored significantly below the average (all scores
below 8, mean score 6.5 ± 0.8). Data of two participants
(one from each group) were excluded from further analy-
ses. One made 33 % errors on average, and the other failed
to follow the given instructions.
The selected participants started the main experiment
with three practice blocks of 50 trials, practicing first each
task separately and then switching between the two tasks.
In each trial, the participants chose which task to perform
according to instructions taken from prior voluntary choice
studies (Arrington and Logan 2004, 2005; Yeung 2010).
Specifically, they were instructed to perform each task on
about half the trials, and to try to perform the tasks in a
random order, ‘‘as if flipping a coin that said ‘shape’ on one
side and ‘location’ on the other’’. They were furthermore
explicitly instructed to make their choice before actually
pressing the space bar.
Following practice, participants completed 6 blocks
with voluntary choice procedure of 60 trials each. A trial
started with the cue that appeared above the stimulus grid
and remained there until the participant pressed the space
bar indicating that they had decided which task to perform
next. The imperative stimulus then appeared 300 ms later
and remained on the screen until the response was given,
followed by an interval of 500 ms showing the stimulus
grid only. Both the choice of task and the actual response
were not limited in time. At the end of each block, par-
ticipants were given feedback showing their average
response time (RT) and error rate as well as their task
choices and the number of task switches and repetitions
they made.
Data Analysis
We analyzed the data focusing on two measures of task
execution (RTs and error rates) and, critically, on two
measures of task choice (participants’ actual choices and
the speed with which they indicated these choices). All the
measures were analyzed separately using repeated mea-
sures analyses of variance (ANOVAs), with task (location/
shape) and transition type (switch/repeat) as within-subject
factors, and AQ group (low/high) as between-subject fac-
tor. For the purpose of these analyses, each trial was first
categorized according to task and transition type. Specifi-
cally, the task on a given trial was specified by the hand
that the participant used to respond, and the transition type
was determined according to the relation between the task
performed on the current and the previous trial. A trial was
coded as an error if the participant responded with the
wrong finger of the used hand. Finally, analyses excluded
the first trial of each block, and, for RT analyses, error
trials and trials following errors.
Results
To establish that the tasks differed in their relative diffi-
culty as intended, and that patterns of switch costs would
replicate the asymmetry previously reported in studies
using the voluntary switching procedure, we first present
data analysis of overall task execution. To furthermore
establish that our participants used the cue period to make
deliberative task choices, we then present analysis of
choice speed before presenting the critical analyses of data
of interest—participants’ task choices.
Task Execution
Participants were on average both faster, F (1, 35) =
38.38; p \ 0.01, and more accurate, F (1, 35) = 19.03;
p \ 0.01, when responding to the location of the stimulus
(618 ms and 2.8 % errors) than when responding to its
shape (752 ms and 5.8 % errors). This finding indicated the
Location task as the relatively easier of the two, confirming
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the expected differences in task difficulty. The established
task difficulty effect was similar in both AQ groups, F \ 1
(see Table 1).
Furthermore, task execution on switch trials (766 ms
and 5.1 % errors) was both slower, F (1, 35) = 33.95;
p \ 0.01, and more error-prone, F (1, 35) = 5.76;
p = 0.02, than task execution on repeat trials (605 ms and
3.5 % errors), indicating clear switch costs in both RTs and
errors, neither of which differed between the two AQ
groups, Fs \ 1. Of interest here was to establish whether
differences in task difficulty modulated task switching
performance. The existence of this switch cost asymmetry
was uncertain considering that the participants had unlim-
ited time to make and indicate their task choices in our
voluntary procedure. As shown in Fig. 1a, we indeed
observed the asymmetry in the RT data, with a significant
interaction between task and transition type, F (1,35) =
9.04; p \ 0.01, indicating greater costs when switching to
the easier location task than when switching to the harder
shape task. No interaction was observed in the error data,
F \ 1. Importantly, the switch cost asymmetry was similar
in both AQ groups, with the interaction between task,
transition type, and AQ group not being significant either in
RTs or in errors, Fs (1,35) \ 2.25; ps [ 0.14 (see Table 1).
Choice Speed
By analyzing the choice speed data, we aimed to assess
whether the participants actively used the cue period to
prepare themselves and to make deliberative task choices
before hitting the space bar. Figure 1b shows how average
choice speed was distributed across experimental condi-
tions. Our data suggest that the participants indeed actively
used the cue period, taking significantly more time to
prepare for a task switch (460 ms) than a task repetition
(333 ms), F (1,35) = 4.28; p \ 0.05. As Fig. 1b illustrates,
we furthermore observed a marginal interaction between
task and transition type, F (1,35) = 3.74; p \ 0.06, with
the participants taking the most time to prepare the switch
Table 1 Mean response time
(ms), error rate (%), and choice
time (ms) for low and high AQ
participants as a function of task
and transition type
None of the effects significantly
differed between the two groups
Low AQ participants (n = 21) High AQ participants (n = 18)
Response time Error rate Choice time Response time Error rate Choice time
Location
Switch 800 4.6 418 652 3.1 455
Repeat 532 1.7 356 488 1.9 320
Switch cost 268 2.9 62 164 1.2 135
Shape
Switch 844 5.6 455 764 7.1 512
Repeat 744 5.0 315 656 5.6 343
Switch cost 100 0.6 140 108 1.5 169
A
B
Fig. 1 Task execution data and choice speed. Panel A depicts mean
response times and error rates for the location and the shape task as a
function of transition type (switch or repeat). Panel B depicts the
mean time participants took before pressing the space bar as an
indication that they have chosen the task to perform next. Error bars
indicate SE of the mean
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toward the shape task. Both the main effect of transition
type and its interaction with task showed similar patterns in
both AQ groups, Fs \ 1 (see Table 1).
Task Choice
Analyzing the task choice data was of main interest in the
present study, as it permitted testing the idea that the
individuals with more autistic traits would show a stronger
repetition bias, since repetitive behavior is considered to be
one of the core characteristics of autism. We were therefore
interested to see if the asymmetry in repetition bias, as
previously observed in voluntary procedures using tasks
that differ in their relative difficulty (e.g., Millington et al.
2012; Yeung 2010), would be stronger in our participants
with high AQ scores. Consistent with this idea, we first
replicated the general repetition bias, with participants
choosing to repeat tasks more often (74 % of all trials)
than choosing to switch tasks (26 % of all trials),
F (1,35) = 53.31; p \ 0.01. Furthermore, we replicated the
asymmetry in repetition bias, with participants choosing to
repeat the difficult shape task more often (40 % of all trials)
than the easier location task (35 % of all trials), F (1,35) =
31.39, p \ 0.01. Critically, however, a significant interac-
tion between task, transition type, and AQ group was
observed, F (1,35) = 4.70, p \ 0.05. This finding indicates
that although the asymmetry in repetition bias was present
in both groups, with F (1,16) = 9.91, p \ 0.01 and
F(1,19) = 23.84, p \ 0.01, for low and high AQ group
respectively, the repetition bias towards the harder shape
task was more strongly apparent for the participants having
more autistic traits, as depicted in Fig. 2.
To further investigate our observation of a stronger
asymmetry in repetition bias for high AQ participants, we
analyzed an additional measure of repetitive behavior—the
length of runs of trials participants make when given the
voluntary choice of two tasks. Our replication of repetition
bias implied already that our participants exhibited biases
away from randomness although instructed to produce
equal numbers of trials of each task and equal numbers of
switch and repeat trials. Of particular interest here was to
test whether the significantly stronger preference for
repeating the harder shape task in high AQ participants as
observed in percentages of task choices would also be
observed as a tendency to produce longer runs for this task.
The measure of run length is possibly the only way for a
task preference to be expressed in voluntary procedures
using two tasks, since the overall numbers of switches and
runs when there are only two tasks must necessarily be
roughly equivalent (Yeung 2010).
For the purpose of this analysis, we first categorized
each trial by its position in the task run. We then calculated
the logarithm of the average run of the two tasks for each
participant. The logarithmic transformation was applied to
correct for the differences in variance due to the skewed
distribution of the run length. The analysis confirmed the
general asymmetry in repetition bias also in this measure,
F (1,35) = 29.77, p \ 0.01, with participants making
longer runs for the harder shape task (7.2 trials) than the
easier location task (6.3 trials). Crucially, however, a
significant interaction between task and AQ group,
F (1,35) = 4.27, p \ 0.05, confirmed that this tendency to
produce longer runs in the harder task was significantly
stronger in the participants with high AQ. Specifically,
although the participants with low AQ also demonstrated
the asymmetry in run length, F (1,16) = 11.23, p \ 0.01,
with the difference between the shape and the location task
being 0.7 trials, the participants with high AQ showed a
significantly stronger tendency to produce longer runs of
trials in the harder task, with the difference being 1.1 trials
in this group, F (1,19) = 21.33, p \ 0.01.
Repetitive behavior seems to be a complex construct
reflected in behavior of individuals with autism across
multiple distinct facets (e.g., Lam et al. 2008; Langen et al.
2011). Interestingly, a subset of items (10 out of 50)
included in the AQ is related to restrictive and repetitive
behaviors—Attention switching domain, as described in
Hoekstra et al. (2008). We therefore used these scores to
test their possible contribution to repetitive behaviors as
measured in our voluntary procedure. We first counted the
scores that each of our participants had on the items
belonging to the Attention switching domain, measuring
repetitive behavior. We then calculated the relative con-
tribution of these items to the total AQ score as a difference
between this actual score and their expected contribution to
the total AQ score (i.e., expected was 20 % of the total
score). The relative contribution of repetitive behavior as
measured by the AQ was significantly higher than 0 in both
high AQ, with average relative contribution of 1.13,
t(19) = 3.12, p = 0.006, and in low AQ participants, with
Fig. 2 Percentage of task choice for the location and the shape task
as a function of transition type (switch or repeat) in the low and high
AQ participants. Error bars indicate SE of the mean
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average relative contribution of 0.92, t(16) = 3.07,
p = 0.007. Moreover, the average contribution of repeti-
tive behavior did not significantly differ between the
groups, t(35) = -0.44, p = 0.66. Interestingly, when
taken as a covariate, the items measuring repetitive
behavior did not modulate the general tendency to choose
the harder task more often or to make longer runs for this
task, Fs \ 1. Analyzing each of the AQ groups separately
confirmed the general observation: the repetitive behavior
ratio did not significantly influence task choice or run
length in high AQ participants, Fs \ 1, nor in low AQ
participants, F (1,15) = 1.01, p = 0.33 and F \ 1,
respectively.
Collectively, our task choice data demonstrated a sig-
nificantly stronger asymmetry in repetition bias for the
participants with more autistic traits in both of its mea-
sures—percentages of task choice and run length. The two
measures are highly correlated in general (r = 0.91;
p \ 0.001), and when tested in both of the tasks separately
(r = 0.90; p \ 0.001; and r = 0.88; p \ 0.001; for the
location and the shape task, respectively). Task choice and
run length were not significantly modulated by the items
within the AQ scale related to restrictive and repetitive
behaviors. The final analysis we performed on the task
choice data aimed to further investigate the processes
contributing to the observed asymmetry in repetition bias.
Previous studies have already shown that repeating tasks is
in general facilitated by stimulus repetition (Mayr and Bell
2006; Yeung 2010), suggesting that bottom-up stimulus
processing affects people’s intentions and contributes to
the repetition bias observed in voluntary procedures.
Although our participants were instructed to make their
choice during the cue period and to indicate to have made
the choice by pressing the space bar, which then initiated
the stimulus presentation, it is still possible that their final
task choices were affected by the subsequent stimulus
processing such that they disregarded their initial inten-
tions. Just recently, Millington et al. (2012, Experiment 2)
used a similar space-bar voluntary procedure and observed
a tendency in their participants to occasionally ignore the
initial intention and repeat the shape task more often when
the shape of the stimulus repeated. We therefore aimed to
test if our observation of the stronger asymmetry in repe-
tition bias in people with more autistic traits was possibly
generated or in some way affected by bottom-up stimulus
processing. Table 2 shows how the proportion of task
repetitions were distributed over different types of stimulus
repetitions (shape, location, both, or neither repeated) for
both low and high AQ participants. We only observed a
marginal interaction between AQ group and repetition of
stimulus shape, F (1,35) = 3.41, p = 0.07, with the pro-
portion of task repetitions not being significantly different
when stimulus shape repeated (0.80) from when it changed
(0.79) in participants with high AQ, F (1,19) = 2.41,
p = 0.14, whereas the participants with low AQ repeated
tasks more when the stimulus shape repeated (0.76) than
when it changed (0.71), F (1,16) = 7.41, p \ 0.05. This
finding indicates that the stronger asymmetry in repetition
bias towards the harder shape task observed in high AQ
participants did not simply arise from stimulus repetition.
Furthermore, repetition of stimulus location only generally
increased the proportion of task repetitions, F (1,35) =
7.02, p \ 0.05, from 0.75 to 0.78, showing no interaction
with AQ group, F \ 1.
Discussion
The primary aim of this study was to investigate the
mechanism behind the tendency to exhibit repetitive
behavior reported in autism. To this end, we compared
behavioral patterns in voluntary task choice in healthy
individuals varying in their level of autistic traits as mea-
sured by the AQ. The findings demonstrate a significantly
stronger tendency to specifically repeat the harder task
more often for the participants with high level of autistic
traits. Consistent with other studies showing that the AQ
predicts various cognitive abilities similar to that found in
ASD (e.g., Fugard et al. 2011), these results confirm that a
comparable bias toward repetitive behavior—one of the
main symptoms of ASD—can also be detected when
measuring voluntary task choices in the broader autism
phenotype as assessed by the AQ.
Table 2 Proportion of task
repetitions as a function of
whether the stimulus location
and stimulus shape repeated
from the previous trial
Location changes Location repeats
Shape changes Shape repeats Shape changes Shape repeats
Low AQ participants
Just performed location 0.70 0.75 0.71 0.76
Just performed shape 0.71 0.73 0.72 0.80
High AQ participants
Just performed location 0.74 0.77 0.80 0.81
Just performed shape 0.78 0.79 0.82 0.83
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Critically, these findings suggest that the repetition bias
in autism arises from processes involved in the formation
of general task intentions rather than from those involved
in task execution: While the patterns of task choice—both
the proportion of task choices as well as the run length—
showed a stronger bias toward repeating the harder task in
participants with more autistic traits, no differences in
behavior during actual task execution were found between
high and low AQ participants. Consistent with previously
reported patterns of task switching performance in autism
(e.g., Poljac et al. 2010; Schmitz et al. 2006; Shafritz et al.
2008; Stahl and Pry 2002; Whitehouse et al. 2006), the two
AQ groups showed no differences in switch-specific per-
formance. Specifically, both groups replicated earlier
results from studies using voluntary procedure in a similar
way by showing a reliable switch cost (e.g., Arrington and
Logan 2004) as well as a reliable asymmetry in switch cost
(e.g., Yeung 2010). Since the behavioral patterns of the two
AQ groups were overall similar, showing no differences in
any of the measures other than participants’ task choice, it
seems highly unlikely that the stronger asymmetry in rep-
etition bias observed in high AQ group developed from
some kind of a general impairment in their task perfor-
mance. In fact, high AQ participants were in general
numerically faster in task execution (640 vs. 730 ms for
high and low AQ, respectively), showed numerically
smaller switch costs (136 vs. 183 ms) as well as a
numerically smaller switch cost asymmetry (56 vs.
168 ms). These patterns strongly suggest that the specific
differences observed in repetition bias are not simply
generated by some general discrepancy in task perfor-
mance between the two groups.
The observed asymmetry in participants’ switch costs
and task choices replicated previous findings in studies
using voluntary task switching procedures (e.g., Millington
et al. 2012; Yeung 2010). These findings clearly indicate
the existence of interference in our study. As expected, this
interference between the two competing tasks affected the
processes involved in task execution (switch cost asym-
metry) and in task intentions (task repetition asymmetry).
Importantly, however, the observation of a significantly
stronger asymmetry in task repetitions in participants with
more autistic traits suggests that the strong preference for
repetitive behavior in autism is most probably generated by
interference between the competing tasks modulating the
formation of task intentions. Just recently, Poljac and
Yeung (2012) provided neural evidence for the involve-
ment of between-task interference in intentional task
preparation when tasks are chosen voluntarily, confirming
these and other behavioral data (e.g., Arrington and Logan
2005; Mayr and Bell 2006; Millington et al. 2012; Orr and
Weissman 2011; Yeung 2010). Poljac and Yeung’s data
suggest that between-task interference modulates global
task intentions rather than either motor-related preparation
or the actual task execution. It thus seems that between-
task interference in our study affects the formation of
intentions for voluntary actions in people with high level of
autistic traits more than it does in those with less autistic
traits.
This remarkable tendency to repeat the harder task of a
pair has been suggested to reflect differences in control
biases being stronger in the harder task (cf. Gilbert and
Shallice 2002; Yeung and Monsell 2003). According to this
idea, the persisting biases toward the harder task increase
the difficulty of switching away from this task to the easier
task, leading participants to exhibit a surprising preference
for performing the harder task (Yeung 2010). Following
this line of reasoning, our findings suggest that the differ-
ence in control biases between the two tasks was larger in
participants with more autistic traits. The stronger biases
required for the harder task were possibly additionally
enhanced in our high AQ group, creating a significantly
stronger attractor state that is less likely to decay over time,
so that, once the choice for this harder task has been made,
these participants were more inclined to continue per-
forming this overall more effortful task. In other words, the
difference in repetitive behavior observed in our study
seems to be generated by a dynamic interaction of differ-
ences in control biases that individuals varying across the
dimension of autistic traits have for tasks, influencing the
formation of task intentions when the task choice is
voluntary.
This account would also predict the observed persever-
ative behavior in the WCST (e.g., Liss et al. 2001; Ozonoff
and Jensen 1999), in which the interplay of control biases
for tasks become especially important since the tasks are
not defined to the participants in advance. Accordingly,
when the appropriate rule—defined by the experimental
procedure—has been selected and reinforced by feedback,
this task develops a strong attractor state making it hard to
abandon it if the rule implicitly changes. Since in the
WCST task alternatives are not specified, abandoning this
highly preferred task then becomes particularly difficult in
individuals with ASD who seem to be more sensitive to the
influence that differences in control biases have on the
formation of intentions for voluntary actions. Directing
intentions by providing cues, on the other hand, aids task
execution in individuals with ASD, reflected in behavior as
an overall similar pattern between them and their healthy
controls (e.g., Poljac et al. 2010). The influence of control
biases in these instructed designs would be expected to
become apparent as stronger switch cost asymmetries in
individuals with ASD. An interesting analogy comes from
studies examining memory functioning in autism reporting
that, while cued-recall paradigms tend to yield no deviant
performance (e.g., Bowler et al. 1997), free-recall
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paradigms generally lead to diminished performance in this
population (e.g., Gaigg et al. 2008; Smith et al. 2007),
emphasizing again the importance of intentional directing
in autism. Our findings are also in line with the idea of an
open versus closed system account of autism proposed by
Lawson et al. (2003, 2004). According to this view, indi-
viduals with autism are biased to approach the world as a
closed system, that is, as a system in which degrees of
freedom are minimized. According to Lawson and col-
leagues, this bias is why they experience difficulties with
tasks that are more open (i.e., include more variability). In
this type of task, top-down intentions are more crucial, such
is the case in the voluntary procedure used in our study.
It is worthy of note here that, similar to the observation
reported by Millington et al. (2012) in their Experiment 2,
all participants tended to be particularly slow in making the
choice of switching to the more difficult shape task, even
though they exhibited an overall bias toward choosing this
task more often. Participants also took more time to choose
task switches compared to task repetitions (see also Ar-
rington and Logan 2005; Orr and Weissman 2011). In both
conditions they took more time to choose—task switching
in general and switching to the harder task in particular—
suggesting that our choice time findings might reflect
participants’ preference for minimizing effort (e.g.,
Arrington 2008; Arrington and Yates 2009; Lien and
Ruthruff 2008). This preference for less effort is possibly
also reflected in the observed effects between task choice
and stimulus processing. Similar to what other studies
using voluntary procedure have already reported (e.g.,
Arrington an Logan 2005; Mayr and Bell 2006; Yeung
2010), our participants were in general inclined to repeat
the task at hand more often if the stimulus repeated, sug-
gesting that external bottom-up stimulation occasionally
determined the eventual task choice. Importantly, however,
this bottom-up influence of stimulus processing on task
choice seems not to be the driving mechanism behind the
stronger asymmetry in repetition bias detected in the par-
ticipants with more autistic traits: The only difference
between the two groups observed when analyzing the
effects of stimulus repetition on task choice revealed that,
whereas task choices of high AQ participants were not
affected by repetitions of stimulus shape, the participants
with low level of autistic traits were more prone to repeat
the task at hand on these occasions. This finding evidently
implies that the stronger bias toward repeating the shape
task in high AQ participants is not generated by differences
in effects of stimulus repetitions between the two groups.
Three additional issues regarding our findings need
further elaboration. First, the high number of female par-
ticipants in our study reflected the gender distribution in the
population we tested—undergraduate psychology students.
Although additional analyses demonstrated that none of
our findings were significantly affected by gender (Fs \ 1),
the predominantly female population makes it harder to
generalize our findings to the autism population for two
reasons: the prevalence of autism is higher in males, and
male and female individuals with autism seem to differ in
behavior in various aspects (e.g., Lai et al. 2011). Whether
our findings are generalizable to female individuals with
autism only would need to be addressed in future research.
Second, instructions used in voluntary task switching
paradigms typically stress the requirement to choose tasks
randomly and equally often. The instruction regarding
balanced task choices could require participants to keep
track of which tasks they have performed in past, putting
high demands on their working memory. Some studies
have reported that individuals with autism are challenged
on working memory tasks (e.g., Geurts et al. 2004; Zinke
et al. 2010). It could therefore be possible that the observed
differences in our study were predominantly due to the
challenge that our high AQ participants experienced with
keeping track of task history. Interestingly, however, Butler
et al. (2011) recently demonstrated that working memory
capacity is more strongly related to task performance than
to task choice in voluntary task switching. If our AQ
groups differed in the way that they were challenged by
high working memory demands present in the task we
used, then according to Butler et al., this should have been
reflected in the performance measures (RTs and error rates)
of the two groups. We observed no such differences.
Although we cannot exclude the possibility that working
memory contributed to the observed differences between
high and low AQ participants, Butler et al.’s study and our
observations in task performance together would suggest
that our findings would need a broader explanation than
one including working memory only.
Third, it is possible that some other important factors,
such as intelligence, modulated the patterns of behavior in
the population that we tested. One could imagine that the
numerically better performance—observed in the high AQ
participants—was generated by a higher IQ in these indi-
viduals. Since we had no a priori reasons to assume that our
student population would differ in their IQ, we did not
assess any measures of their intelligence. We therefore
cannot exclude the possibility that intelligence significantly
contributed to the observed differences between our
groups. To our knowledge, there are no studies so far
reporting a relation between IQ and performance on vol-
untary task switching paradigms. Interestingly, however,
the few studies that have tested a possible contribution of
IQ to observed differences between high and low AQ
individuals seem not to find any dependence of the AQ
effects on IQ in children (Auyeung et al. 2009) or in adults
(students) for verbal (Stewart and Ota 2008) or full IQ
measures (Grinter et al. 2009). The contribution of IQ to
J Autism Dev Disord (2012) 42:2523–2533 2531
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behavioral patterns observed in voluntary task switching
paradigms would need to be specified in future research.
In conclusion, the present study indicates that between-
task interference significantly contributes to the tendency
of individuals with autism to engage in repetitive behavior
by modulating the formation of task intentions when tasks
are chosen voluntarily. Our results reveal that the way in
which between-task interference modulates global task
intentions—as measured by behavioral patterns in task
choice—depends on the quantification of where an indi-
vidual lies along the dimension of autistic traits. On the
contrary, the way that task execution—as measured by
behavioral patterns in RTs and errors—is affected by this
interference between the competing tasks seems not to be
related to the amount of autistic traits in healthy
individuals.
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